本期推文包含了国际顶级会计学期刊Journal of Accounting and Economics Volume73 Issue 2-3中的两篇管理会计相关的论文。
Economic consequences of managerial compensation contract disclosure
Journal of Accounting and Economics
April-May2022
Volume 73 Issue 2-3
YanXiong
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, China
XuJiang
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, United States
Abstract：We analytically study the economic consequences of the disclosure of managerialcompensation contracts in a setting where two firms, by designing compensationcontracts for their respective managers, compete for a new investmentopportunity. Each manager is privately informed about her firm's profitabilityfrom this investment. We find that the disclosure leads to firms' emphasizingshort-term stock performance in their managers' contracts. This, in turn,induces managers to signal favorable private information via myopicoverinvestment, which deters rival firms' investments and gains their own firmsa competitive edge. Nonetheless, such strategic use of compensation contractsis absent when the contracts are not disclosed; under this regime, equilibriumcontracts only focus on long-term outcomes. Moreover, whiledisclosure-mandate-induced managerial myopia erodes firm profits, it maybenefit consumer and social welfare. Our theory illuminates the economicconsequences of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) disclosureimplemented in 2006.
Keywords: Compensation contract disclosure;CD&A disclosure; Managerial myopia; Coordination failure; Marketcompetition
原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S016541012200012X
Who did it matters: Executive equity compensation and financial reporting fraud
Journal of Accounting and Economics
April-May2022
Volume 73 Issue 2-3
Robert H. Davidson
Pamplin School of Business, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, US
Abstract：In within-firm analysis of 1,805 executives, executives implicated in financialreporting fraud cases have significantly stronger equity incentives than theirwithin-firm peers who are not implicated in the fraud. Executives implicated infraud cases also have significantly stronger equity incentives than executivesat non-fraud firms in similar roles. However, the equity incentives ofnon-implicated executives at fraud firms are no different than those forexecutives at non-fraud firms. The results are significant across executiveroles and for equity incentives measured as wealth sensitivity to changes instock price or stock price volatility. Executive-level analysis that considerswhich executives are implicated in the fraud may provide more precisemeasurement of the association and statistical significance of the relationshipbetween equity incentives and fraud. Finally, firm-level measures that considerthe equity incentives of all members of the top management team may betteridentify fraud firms than do measures focusing on one executive.
Keywords: Financial reporting fraud; Equitycompensation; Executive equity incentives
原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165410121000689
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